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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Nudging Charitable Giving: The ethics of Nudge in
international poverty reduction
Joshua Hobbs
School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
ABSTRACT
The use of nudge theory by non-governmental organizations and
governments as a means to encourage charitable donations in order
to address global poverty has been the subject of much recent enthu-
siasm. Supporters argue that nudges aimed at altering behaviour are
much less complex and normatively problematic than attempts to
alter attitudes towards global poverty. This paper aims to challenge
these assumptions. In order to do so, it identiﬁes problems and short-
comings of the nudge approach, suggesting we should look again at
alternative strategies. The argument consists of three parts. Section 1
outlines the nudge approach, dividing nudges into three distinct
categories. Nudges in the ﬁrst category, which operate through simple
information provision, face no compelling objections as a means to
motivate charitable giving. Section 2 examines nudges in the third
category, typically considered the most pernicious form of nudge in
the critical literature. As these nudges aim to bypass reﬂection, their
use faces distinct normative problems in the context of global poverty.
The third section, comprising the bulk of the discussion, examines the
complex case presented by second-category nudges, which capitalize
on prudential sources of motivation in order to motivate action to
address global poverty. It argues that, although such casesmay appear
straightforward instances of favouring good outcomes over good
motives, the reality is much more complex. Altering behaviour pro-
vides no easy substitute for the complex and vital task of altering
attitudes towards global poverty.
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Introduction
Global poverty represents a problem of pressing normative urgency.1 Despite broad
agreement that addressing this problem requires some action by ordinary citizens
within the more aﬄuent communities of the world, action is rarely forthcoming. In
order to motivate this action, the following two broad strategies have been proposed:
ﬁrstly, that we try to alter the underlying dispositions of individuals, increasing levels of
concern for the global poor, with the hope that this change in attitudes will engender
action to reduce global poverty2; and secondly, that we attempt to inﬂuence actions
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anonymous reviewers, and the editorial team of Ethics & Global Politics for their helpful comments.
2For an example of this strategy, see Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought.
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directly, by prompting changes in unreﬂective behaviour or altering the conditions in
which choices are made.
Nudge theory,3 as advocated by the British Government’s Behavioural Insights
Team, and corresponding ‘Nudge Units’ in the United States and elsewhere, represents
a version of this second strategy. Supporters argue that altering behaviour directly is a
much less complex and normatively problematic aﬀair than attempting to alter
attitudes.4 This paper aims to challenge these assumptions. In order to do so, it
identiﬁes problems and shortcomings with the nudge approach that suggest we ought
to reconsider the former strategy.
The paper consists of three parts. Section 1 outlines and clariﬁes the nudge approach,
oﬀering a three-part typology of nudges appropriate for the context of charitable giving. It
then proceeds to assess nudges in the ﬁrst category, arguing that their use in this context
is relatively benign. Section 2 examines nudges in the third category, typically considered
the most pernicious form of nudge in the critical literature. It argues that as these nudges
circumvent reﬂection on an issue, their use to motivate donations towards reducing
global poverty faces signiﬁcant normative objections. However, opportunities for their
employment in this context are limited. The third section, comprising the bulk of the
discussion, examines the complex case presented by second-category nudges. It argues
that these pose a distinctively problematic means of altering other directed behaviour, as
they are unlikely to engender a corresponding change in normative attitudes.
Part I: deﬁning nudges
In the book in which they coined the term, Thaler and Sunstein describe a nudge as
‘any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way
without forbidding any options or signiﬁcantly changing their economic incentives’.5
This is unhelpfully broad, and encompasses some techniques they explicitly rule out,
such as minor ﬁnes or other low-level sanctions.6 However, Thaler and Sunstein’s
deﬁnition draws attention to a key diﬀerence between nudges and more traditional
persuasion techniques. Distinct from traditional fundraising techniques, or government
use of social advertising, nudges primarily aim to alter behaviour, rather than achieve
attitudinal change. As Mols et al. put this, nudges attempt to achieve norm compliance,
as opposed to norm internalization.7 Similarly, McTernan diﬀerentiates between tradi-
tional interventions ‘where the cause of the behavior is internalizing the norms of one’s
society and acting accordingly…[and] nudges, where behavior is inﬂuenced through
minor situational factors.’8
Nudges are typically illustrated through the use of examples. The paradigm cases are
the etching of a ﬂy in urinals at Schiphol Airport to ‘improve aim’, and the ‘Don’t Mess
With Texas’ anti-littering campaign, in which American football players were employed
to help create associations in the minds of young men between disposing of rubbish
3Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge.
4Lichtenberg, Distant Strangers.
5Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 6.
6Ibid., 81–103.
7Mols et al., “Why a Nudge is Not Enough,” 84.
8McTernan, “How to Make Citizens Behave,” 100.
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responsibly and masculinity.9 Judith Lichtenberg oﬀers the following diversity of
examples in her account of utilizing nudges to facilitate charitable giving: the use of
defaults ‘for example, an opt-out system on income tax forms in donating a certain
amount to reducing poverty’; pre-commitment, capitalizing on the widespread bias to
‘overvalue present satisfactions and undervalue future ones’ to encourage people to
commit now to substantial future donations; and framing donations so as to make them
seem less burdensome, eschewing larger upfront ﬁgures in favour of a focus on ‘pennies
a day’.10 The breadth of these examples demonstrates that any attempt to subject
nudges to normative assessment requires drawing ﬁner distinctions, as a number of
diﬀerent strategies of behavioural modiﬁcation are encompassed under the general
term. Accordingly, both the eﬀectiveness and the normative status of these strategies
as means to motivate donations to global poverty charities will diﬀer.
It is important to note the two following factors, which are speciﬁc to the assessment
of nudges in the context of charitable giving: ﬁrstly, nudges are being used here to alter
other-directed behaviour, not self-directed behaviour such as lifestyle choices. Therefore,
paternalism, as traditionally understood, is not the main concern in this context. Thaler
and Sunstein deﬁne paternalism as ‘making choosers better oﬀ, as judged by
themselves.’11 However, nudges aimed at promoting charitable giving neither require
the nudging authority to know an individual’s best interests, nor do they aim to make
nudged individuals better oﬀ. Similarly, the use of nudges is often objected to on the
basis that it is manipulative, or even coercive,12 but there is a strong prima facie
normative justiﬁcation for the use of such techniques in this context, in the form of
realizing the basic rights of the global poor.
Secondly, nudges are not being employed here to address bounded rationality
leading to reasoning failure by the well intentioned. Instead, the issues nudges seek to
address are, in signiﬁcant part, attitudinal, with individuals not caring, or not caring
enough, about the problem presented by global poverty. Accordingly, employing
nudges faces distinct normative concerns in this context, as they do not simply operate
to bring actions into line with considered attitudes, but to achieve behavioural changes
that may not reﬂect an underlying normative commitment.
Three types of nudge
To eﬀectively assess the use of nudges as a means to motivate donations towards
reducing global poverty, it is necessary to separate nudges into three distinct categories.
I broadly follow the three-part distinction drawn by Baldwin; however, whereas
Baldwin’s central concern is the extent to which nudges interfere with autonomy, the
following categories diﬀerentiate between the diﬀerent ways nudges interact with an
agent’s motivational structure.13
9Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 64.
10Lichtenberg, Distant Strangers, 243.
11Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 5.
12For example, see Hausman and Welch, “To Nudge or Not to Nudge.”
13Baldwin, “From Regulation to Behaviour Change.”
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First-category nudges: nudges in this category have been the source of some con-
troversy in the literature. Many critics14 do not consider them to constitute nudges at
all, as they operate at a reﬂective level. First-category nudges aim to enhance decision-
making through ‘the supply of simple information…or the imparting of reminders.’15
Examples include ‘warning labels on cigarettes’ and ‘signs warning people on a hot day
to drink more water.’16 These interventions are characterized by operating at a delib-
erative level, and aiming to alter behaviour without attempting to alter an agent’s
existing motivations.
Second-category nudges: Baldwin’s second category contains nudges that ‘build
on behavioral or volitional limitations so as to bias a decision in the desired
direction…[Where] the target of the nudge would be capable, on reﬂection, of
realizing that a nudge has been administered.’17 I deﬁne second-category nudges
as those that utilize non-altruistic motives to increase giving. Where this second
category overlaps with Baldwin’s is that, in both cases, the nudge is available to
conscious reﬂection. The paradigm example of a second-category nudge on either
account would be the ‘Don’t Mess with Texas’ anti-littering campaign. Here, the
decision not to litter is biased in the desired direction by the motive to live up to an
ideal of masculinity. However, on reﬂection, the campaign’s attempt to inﬂuence
behaviour is consciously available.
Third-category nudges: rather than taking advantage of an alternative source of
motivation, these nudges operate by circumventing motives altogether, with the agent
making a donation without necessarily being aware that they have done so. A typical
example would be switching from an opt-out to an opt-in default in a workplace giving
scheme. Rather than capitalizing on prudential motives, the desired behaviour is
primarily secured through inattention, with the success of the nudge relying on this
lack of transparency. This has aﬃnities with Hansen and Jespersen’s deﬁnition of a
non-transparent nudge, where ‘the citizen in the situation cannot reconstruct either the
intention or the means by which behavioral change is pursued.’18
Thaler and Sunstein are likely aware that this form of nudge is normatively proble-
matic, and, inﬂuenced by Rawls, they include a publicity condition in their account,
where a government must be ‘able or willing to defend [nudges] publically to its own
citizens.’19 Crucially, however, this is only a hypothetical requirement, because as
Thaler and Sunstein acknowledge, pointing out a default would render the default
ineﬀective.20 In contrast, Rawls’ publicity principle is not hypothetical, requiring ‘that
principles be known and understood by the public, not merely that they be publically
defensible.’21 Due to the deceptive manner in which they operate, third-category nudges
are considered the most pernicious form of nudge in the critical literature.22
14Hausman and Welch, “To Nudge or Not to Nudge”; and Yeung, “Nudge as Fudge.”
15Baldwin, “From Regulation to Behaviour Change,” 835.
16Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 189–244.
17Baldwin, “From Regulation to Behaviour Change,” 836.
18Hansen and Jespersen, “Nudge and the Manipulation of Choice,” 18.
19Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 244.
20As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, a hypothetical publicity condition is not a genuine publicity condition.
21John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 48.
22Hausman and Welch, “To Nudge or Not to Nudge”; and Mols et al., “Why a Nudge is Not Enough.”
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Having drawn these distinctions, I now examine the normative status of these three
types of nudge as a means to motivate donations towards reducing global poverty. It is
important to note that the categories are discussed out of numerical order. I begin with
the more straightforward cases of ﬁrst- and third-category nudges, and then move on to
examine the complex case presented by the employment of second-category nudges in
this context.
First-category nudges
First-category nudges are not typically thought to compromise autonomy in the
decision-making process.23 These nudges consist of the public display of factual infor-
mation; therefore, the idea that they are intrinsically normatively problematic is unper-
suasive. This would rule out public information signs and other everyday instances of
straightforward information provision. Therefore, if ﬁrst-category nudges face norma-
tive objections, these must derive from their employment within a charitable context.
Firstly, I examine the objection that ﬁrst-category nudges are inapplicable when moti-
vating charitable giving, as instances of ‘pure information provision’ cannot occur in
such an emotive context. Having established the applicability of ﬁrst-category nudges in
this context, l move on to examine their use as: (i) a means to facilitate donations; and
(ii) a means to inspire deliberation on global poverty.
Information provision
Instances of ‘pure’ information provision may be thought unlikely to occur once we
move from the heavily debated terrain of health nudges to the context of charitable
giving. This is due to the emotive nature of the information typically featured in
charitable campaigns. The information that ‘25,000 children die of poverty-related
causes everyday,’24 for example, is likely to provoke a signiﬁcant aﬀective reaction.
This has led some critics to conclude that ﬁrst-category nudges, understood as ‘simple
information provision’, cannot exist in charitable campaigns. Hansen and Jespersen, for
example, understand attempts to solicit donations that provoke an emotional response
as attempts to interfere with ‘rational deliberation’, constituting manipulative cases of
nudges proper.25
I believe this conclusion is incorrect and demonstrates that these accounts of
nudges are inadequate when assessing charitable giving. This is because they operate
with accounts of rationality that are inappropriate in a normative context, failing to
recognize the centrality of aﬀect in moral deliberation. As Williams26 has convin-
cingly argued, and recent advances in neuroscience have shown,27 moral deliberation
necessarily involves a signiﬁcant aﬀective component. Therefore, it is unclear that
limiting the emotive force of information will necessarily lead to a more ‘rational
judgement’, as normative reasoning involves both aﬀective and deliberative elements.
Accordingly, materials that provoke sentimental concern cannot be assumed to be an
23Hausman and Welch, “To Nudge or Not to Nudge.”
24Overland, “602 and One Dead,” 281.
25Hansen and Jespersen, “Nudge and the Manipulation of Choice.”
26Williams, Moral Luck.
27Krause, Civil Passions, 8.
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attempt to take advantage of our ‘bounded rationality’. In the context of charitable
campaigns, instances of information provision provoking aﬀective concern are there-
fore still plausibly classiﬁed as ﬁrst-category nudges. This still allows that highly
emotive campaigns interfere with rational deliberation, as I have not claimed that
moral deliberation is purely aﬀective, but that it is implausible to view ideal moral
deliberation as free from aﬀect.
In the context of international poverty reduction, ﬁrst-category nudges can be
utilized in two ways. Firstly, they can facilitate donations by providing information
concerning ways to donate, such as oﬀering reminders or making donating easier.
Secondly, they can provide factual information concerning a charitable cause, aiming
to inspire deliberation leading to a donation.
Facilitating charitable giving
On the ﬁrst method, instances of information provision draw attention to opportunities
for charitable giving, making donating easier or more salient. Here, the motivational
structure of potential donors remains unchanged, but the situation is framed such that a
correlation between the behaviour and the attitudes of individuals who already care
about the issue of global poverty becomes more likely. The use of ﬁrst-category nudges
to facilitate charitable giving in this manner appears uncontroversial. However, David
Miller has raised the possibility that making altruism easier fails to suﬃciently exercise
our altruistic motives, undermining the capacity for altruism in the long run. As Miller
puts this, ‘the theory here being that altruism is a quality that is strengthened by being
exercised and atrophies otherwise.’28 This is not simply the argument that the correct
motives must be present, either for intrinsic or consequential reasons, which would be
unpersuasive, as ﬁrst-category nudges do nothing to facilitate non-altruistic sources of
motivation. Instead, it is the claim that if the correct motive is present, it ought to be
‘stretched’ to yield beneﬁcial long-term consequences. However, this argument provides
no way of knowing when the point is reached at which the beneﬁcial consequences of
the altruistic act outweigh the beneﬁcial consequences of developing the altruistic
capacity. The broad empirical claim underlying this argument – that altruism develops
when it is tested – also does not withstand scrutiny. Numerous social psychology
studies testify to the common-sense conclusion that making altruism more diﬃcult
typically results in altruistic behaviour becoming less likely.29
Inspiring moral deliberation
Alternatively, information provision can focus on the charitable cause itself, with the
aim of inspiring deliberation on global poverty. For example, information concerning
the over 700,000 children under ﬁve years of age who die from malaria each year, when
an insecticidal net costs $4,30 leads to deliberation and ideally a donation. It is diﬃcult
to discern the utility of applying the nudge label to these interventions. However,
Hansen and Jespersen deﬁne this as a ‘type-two’ nudge, which targets a deliberative,
as opposed to an automatic, thought process. The rationale for labelling this a nudge is
28Miller, Justice for Earthlings, 199.
29Darley and Batson, “From Jerusalem to Jericho”; and Zimbardo, The Lucifer Eﬀect.
30Givewell, “Against Malaria Foundation.”
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that it relies on ‘framing eﬀects’, where the frame or context in which a decision
problem is formulated is used to inﬂuence reﬂective choice.31
As Thaler and Sunstein note, it is impossible to avoid framing eﬀects altogether, as
all information is presented in a context.32 However, this fails to distinguish between
active and passive senses of framing, with active framing consisting of attempts to
inﬂuence behaviour by altering the context in which information is presented and
passive framing constituting the acknowledgement that context inﬂuences how infor-
mation is perceived. Attempts to ‘frame’ global poverty as a normative problem in
order to encourage charitable donations can only constitute framing in the passive
sense, as this is the context in which this information typically features in charitable
campaigns. Deﬁning passive framing as a type-two nudge fails to distinguish between
attempts to alter behaviour through manipulating context, and the fact that all
attempts to alter behaviour take place in a context that is thought to be conducive
to this purpose. Instances of information provision presenting global poverty as a
normative problem constitute the typical method through which charities appeal for
donations. As these interventions operate at a reﬂective level and in a transparent
manner, with the resulting donations typically supported by corresponding moral
attitudes, these are straightforward cases of information provision. As the use of ﬁrst-
category nudges in campaigns to reduce global poverty faces no signiﬁcant normative
issues, they will be absent from the remaining discussion. I now move on to discuss
nudges in the third category.
Part II: third-category nudges
Third-category nudges are considered the most normatively problematic form of nudge
in the critical literature, as they operate by bypassing reﬂection altogether, and their
eﬀectiveness is dependent on this lack of transparency. As Bovens notes, these nudges
‘work better in the dark’ and their ‘eﬀects…are likely to disappear if they become
transparent.’33 The typical mechanism through which third-category nudges operate is
switching from an opt-out to an opt-in default, where the nudge succeeds through
capitalizing on the agent’s inattention. An example of this is automatic enrolment in
workplace charitable giving.34
I do not want to deny that third-category nudges operate in a manner that is
normatively problematic. However, in practice, opportunities for the use of third-
category nudges in the context of charitable giving are highly limited. In order for a third-
category nudge to operate, two things are necessary: there needs to be a transaction with a
default option; and it needs to be possible that this default can be altered. In the context
of charitable giving, we have reason to doubt that both will obtain. Transactions with a
default option are limited in this context, as most attempts to solicit donations do not
have this structure. Governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are both
in a position to potentially automatically enrol their own employees into workplace giving
schemes. Beyond this example, any use of a third-category nudge would require a
31Hansen and Jespersen, “Nudge and the Manipulation of Choice,” 27.
32Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 36.
33Bovens, “The Ethics of Nudge.”
34Behavioural Insights Team, “Behavioural Insights to Charitable Giving.”
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ﬁnancial transaction with a third party where a donation was automatically included,
such as a default donation to Oxfam included when purchasing a cinema ticket. It is not
diﬃcult to imagine instances where an opportunity to donate might be included in such
transactions; however, it is diﬃcult to see why a third party would agree for this to
employ an opt-in default. This would make their partnership with the charity less
obvious, and the potentially deceptive nature of the transaction might engender ill will
towards the third party. Cases where third-category nudges are applicable in this context
face a further practical constraint, as opt-in defaults on charitable giving have been legally
prohibited in some countries, such as the United Kingdom.35
Therefore, third-category nudges are not a primary concern for the normative
assessment of nudges in motivating charitable giving. However, as this limited scope
is in part due to legal prohibition, and as such subject to change, there is potential for
their use in this context to become more widespread. Therefore, I want to draw
attention to a novel feature of utilizing third-category nudges in this context, which
raises signiﬁcant normative concerns that are currently absent from the critical litera-
ture. I do so in order to demonstrate that, even where third-category nudges are
applicable, we have reason to favour alternative strategies.
Circumventing reﬂection
Third-category nudges operate through circumventing reﬂection on an issue, the
problematic nature of which has not been addressed in the critical literature. This
presents a distinct problem in campaigns to reduce global poverty, due to the normative
nature of the deliberation being prevented. In typical cases where third-category nudges
are employed as a policy tool, prudential deliberation concerning the relative beneﬁts
that diﬀerent courses of action will have for the deliberator is circumvented in order to
improve the situation of the deliberator. The deliberation that the nudging authority
has circumvented involves the individual reﬂecting on their own situation. However, in
campaigns to secure donations to reduce international poverty, the deliberation that is
circumvented involves the donor reﬂecting on the situation of the global poor. This
reﬂection may be both instrumentally useful – inspiring further action to address global
poverty – and may have some intrinsic normative value.
Instrumental value
By circumventing reﬂection on global poverty, third-category nudges fail to provide any
mechanism through which further action to address global poverty can occur. This act
of reﬂection has instrumental value, as it may increase aﬀective concern for the global
poor and increase the conscious availability of global poverty, and any corresponding
moral demands, to potential donors.
The claim that reﬂecting on global poverty may inspire sentimental concern for
individuals in poverty takes its inspiration from the sentimental cosmopolitan project of
fostering global empathy or solidarity.36 However, here I am concerned with the more
modest role that appeals to sentiment can play in motivating action to reduce global
35Charities Trust, “Best Practice in Payroll Giving.”
36Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought.
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poverty. This ﬁnds some support in the thought that reﬂecting on an issue is more
likely to lead to sentimental engagement with this issue than not reﬂecting on it;
however, the strength of this eﬀect is unclear. Whether reﬂection on the existence of
global poverty leads to aﬀective concern for the global poor will also depend to some
extent on individual psychology and character. Therefore, it is probably unreasonable to
expect the brief reﬂection on global poverty following a request for charitable giving to
result in anything more than a modest aﬀective reaction in most cases. Nevertheless,
insofar as the absence of reﬂection cannot engender any degree of sentimental engage-
ment, this provides a modest reason to favour alternatives.
Even where the degree of reﬂection that a third-category nudge bypasses is
thought to provide insuﬃcient stimulus for signiﬁcant sentimental engagement, it
is important to note that alternative attempts to motivate donations towards redu-
cing global poverty typically attempt to engage sentiments directly. Such appeals to
sentiment are a deﬁning feature of charitable fundraising campaigns. Insofar as
NGOs and governments have limited resources to devote to fundraising, the use of
a third-category nudge will displace an alternative strategy oﬀering a more signiﬁcant
sentimental stimulus.
The social psychology literature on salience also suggests that increased instances
of reﬂecting on an issue cause this issue to be more consciously available.37
Therefore, insofar as third-category nudges bypass reﬂection, they serve to reduce
the availability of the phenomenon of global poverty to potential donors. Whether
conscious availability will inspire action is a diﬀerent matter, and this link cannot
be guaranteed. However, as we are dealing with the reactions of autonomous
agents, all that can be expected to hold is the modest conditional claim that an
issue being consciously available increases the chances of the agent taking action to
address this issue.
In support of this conditional claim, I oﬀer three mechanisms through which the
conscious availability of global poverty can serve to motivate remedial action. Firstly,
for individuals who are already disposed to aid the global poor, increased instances of
reﬂection may make this demand more salient, increasing the chances that they will act.
Secondly, for individuals who are already altruistically disposed, the increased avail-
ability of global poverty may increase the chances that they will devote their altruistic
attentions to this particular cause. Thirdly, reﬂection on global poverty may increase the
likelihood of disinterested individuals becoming more disposed to aid the global poor.
What these mechanisms suggest is that an issue being consciously available to an agent
is more likely to inspire action to address the issue than inaction, all other things being
equal. Therefore, third-category nudges undermining awareness of the issues they aim
to address, coupled with this conditional link between conscious availability and action,
provides a modest reason to favour alternative strategies.
Intrinsic value
There is also plausibly some inherent normative value in donors reﬂecting on the
situation of the global poor, deriving directly from the act of refection itself. As Luc
Boltanski argues, recognition of their suﬀering is something we fundamentally owe to
37Fiske and Morling, “Salience.”
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those in need.38 I take this claim to be intuitively plausible, and it may account for some
of the value placed on apologies and processes of restorative justice.39 However, it is
diﬃcult to oﬀer support for this position beyond this intuitive plausibility, as the
normative claim that it makes is so basic. A weaker version of this argument obtains
without relying on an appeal to potentially diverging intuitions. That it is normatively
preferable for a campaign to foster reﬂection on the poverty it seeks to alleviate, and as
third-category nudges fail to do this, they limit the normative value of the campaign.
This argument oﬀers a reason why third-category nudges are prima facie normatively
inferior to methods of motivating donations that engender reﬂection on global poverty.
Part III: second-category nudges
I now turn to the complex case of employing second-category nudges to motivate
donations towards reducing global poverty. As discussed, the deﬁning feature
of second-category nudges in this context is that they utilize non-altruistic sources of
motivation to facilitate giving. This is typically achieved through attempts to link
charitable donation with high social status. This is exempliﬁed in a recent study in
which ‘oﬀering to publicize the names of everyone who donated a book to the local
library increased donations compared with not oﬀering that incentive.’40 Second-
category nudges present a complex case as a means to motivate donations towards
reducing global poverty. Here, a good outcome is achieved in the form of the donation;
however, this is not primarily motivated by concern for the global poor, or a corre-
sponding normative commitment.
Motives and outcomes
Judith Lichtenberg has recently oﬀered an argument in favour of utilizing nudges to
encourage donations towards reducing global poverty.41 Lichtenberg’s argument is of
particular relevance in assessing second-category nudges, as it is primarily concerned
with justifying why we ought to be more concerned with consequences than with
motives in poverty reduction campaigns. Therefore, it is helpful to examine
Lichtenberg’s argument in some detail.
Lichtenberg’s argument in favour of valuing consequences over motives in cases
where they conﬂict is characteristically nuanced. Starting from a commitment to
pluralism over sources of value, she argues that criticism of nudged charitable giving
rests on a confusion between two separate interests we have in morality: ‘the outer
realm of consequences and outcomes on the one hand, and the inner realm of
character, motives, and reasons on the other.’ She goes on to argue that ‘we should
care, about people’s motives intrinsically’ but that ultimately ‘reducing suﬀering is more
38Boltanski, Distant Suﬀering.
39Responsibility for suﬀering might be thought to make these cases disanalogous. However, it is plausible that the
aﬄuent bear some responsibility for global poverty.
40Behavioural Insights Team, “Behavioural Insights to Charitable Giving,” 10.
41Lichtenberg, Distant Strangers.
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important than the existence of good motives.’42 It is worth quoting Lichtenberg’s
argument at length here:
Suppose we have to choose between the following alternatives…we can eliminate A’s
malnutrition, disease, and ignorance without requiring that B act from good motives.
Or, on the other hand, B has the best will in the world, exerting herself greatly to alleviate
A’s suﬀering, but…A’s malnutrition, disease, and ignorance remain. If these are our only
alternatives, we should choose the former.43
Set out in this binary manner, Lichtenberg’s account is very persuasive. Favouring
motives over consequences when the consequence in question is the reduction of global
poverty is prima facie wrong. Here, favouring consequences over motives seems not
only justiﬁable, but even obligatory. However, this clear separation between motives
and outcomes is only persuasive, and possible, in the context of a philosopher’s
hypothetical. This temporal snapshot is not the end of the matter; countless other
starving individuals remain after A’s ‘malnutrition, disease, and ignorance’ have been
eliminated. Similarly, B’s motives remain, altruistic or otherwise. Just as a one-shot
prisoner’s dilemma cannot tell us very much about social cooperation over time, this
single instance cannot tell us very much about how to think about the normative
signiﬁcance of motives.
In order to challenge Lichtenberg’s argument, I could defend one of two claims: the
stronger claim of the virtue consequentialist position that we exclusively value motives
insofar as certain motives typically produce good outcomes44; or the weaker claim that
we primarily value motives due to the outcomes they typically produce. This is
consistent with the common-sense claim that we also value motives intrinsically to
some degree. Due to reasons of space and doubts over strong virtue consequentialism, I
will focus on the weaker claim: that we cannot easily separate motives from their long-
term eﬀects. Accordingly, it is mistaken to assess the normative permissibility of a
motive in a given context by weighing it against the normative value of the conse-
quences it achieves in this situation narrowly construed.
I oﬀer two arguments in support of this claim: ﬁrstly, an explanatory argument,
which attempts to demonstrate that some of the plausibility of separating motives and
consequences derives from conﬂating backwards-looking and forwards-looking reason-
ing; and secondly, that separating motives from their longer-term consequences loses
further plausibility when assessing nudges, due to the institutional context in which
nudges typically operate. Rather than ascribing praise or blame to the actions of
individuals, the primary concern here is whether institutions ought to capitalize on,
or encourage, the development of certain motives.
The typical situation in which we make normative judgements concerning motives is
in ascribing praise or blame to individuals over actions that have already taken place.
This usually occurs in a legal context, or when judging everyday conduct. There is
typically a single act we are assessing, and we consider motive insofar as it mitigates
praise or blame for that act.45 Assessment takes place after the fact and relevant
42Ibid., 206–9.
43Ibid., 210.
44Driver, Uneasy Virtue.
45Admittedly, in a legal context, certain motives might provide a reason to detain an individual due to their likely future
consequences.
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information is limited to a strictly deﬁned temporal context, which ignores, or does not
prioritize, long-term consequences. An example of this in a legal context would be the
role motive plays in establishing the verdict of attempted murder, or in diﬀerentiating
between murder and manslaughter.46 Further support may be found in the law’s focus
on transgression. Legal assessment of motives is also primarily concerned with cases
where good motives mitigate blame for a bad action, rather than where bad motives
mitigate praise for a good action. This may lead us to underestimate the normative
signiﬁcance of future consequences in the latter case. To clarify, this is neither the claim
that motives have future consequences, nor that consequentialist reasoning faces epis-
temic diﬃculties concerning future action. Instead, I am suggesting that the pervasive-
ness of backwards-looking reasoning in making normative judgements concerning
motives may lend unwarranted plausibility to the idea that motives can be assessed in
isolation from their potential future consequences.
These problems are further compounded when assessing nudge theory due to the
institutional context in which nudges typically operate. Nudges to motivate charitable
giving take place in an institutional context, either directly through governments or
through NGOs. Here, we need to be especially mindful of the link between motives and
future consequences for the two following reasons: ﬁrstly, any negative consequences
will be compounded by aggregative eﬀects, as institutions aﬀect the behaviour of large
numbers of people; and secondly, these institutions are signiﬁcant in shaping ‘public
morality’, or cultural expectations of what is deemed acceptable within a given society.
To some extent, people look to governments and NGOs for normative guidance. This
encompasses both the perhaps slightly naïve assumption that values being propounded
by these institutions increase the credibility of these values, and the expectation that
these institutions in particular will act to promote normative values. Therefore, incor-
porating a motive into these institutions may have a didactic function, appearing to
sanction or encourage this motive.
This magniﬁes potential concerns over the longer-term consequences of encouraging
non-ideal motives. For example, one might hold that acting from a level of self-interest is
a legitimate motive for individuals, but deny that institutions ought to encourage the
development of this motive, even to achieve short-term goods. There are two separate
concerns here: ﬁrstly, that encouraging non-ideal motives may directly lead to negative
consequences; and secondly, that sanctioning non-ideal motives may indirectly encourage
morally objectionable attitudes. For example, donating to charity may become increas-
ingly viewed as a means to increase social status, with normative reasons for donating,
and the recipients themselves, being obscured from the picture. Such attitudes are both
intrinsically normatively problematic and, more signiﬁcantly, may have far-reaching
pernicious consequences, such as a general coarsening of public culture and attitudes.47
I have argued that the separation of motives from their long-term consequences,
which underpins Lichtenberg’s argument, is implausible. Instead, assessment of motives
within a given context needs to take into account the longer-term consequences of
cultivating these motives. Therefore, it mischaracterizes employing second-category
nudges to motivate charitable giving to portray it as a case of favouring positive
46Crown Prosecution Service, “Guidelines on Homicide.”
47This is not to deny that concerns over the credibility of both institutions exist in certain sections of the public.
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outcomes over positive motives. What this fails to take into account is the long-term
eﬀects of the prudential motives being employed and comparing these with alternative
sources of motivation. Having demonstrated why I take Lichtenberg’s account to be
inadequate, I now oﬀer an alternative assessment of the normative status of
employing second-category nudges in the context of international poverty reduction.
Second-category nudges and motives
Second-category nudges can potentially secure desired changes in behaviour in the
instances in which they are employed. However, as they rely on prudential sources of
motivation, they do not attempt to alter attitudes. Therefore, second-category nudges
faces two signiﬁcant objections as a means by which to motivate donations towards
reducing global poverty: ﬁrstly, there may be some intrinsic value in people doing the
right thing for the right reasons; and secondly, altering attitudes may have positive
consequences in the longer term, leading to further action to reduce global poverty.
Although I take the ﬁrst objection to have signiﬁcant merit, I conﬁne my focus to
the second objection, as the consequences in question are of such normative signiﬁ-
cance. To support this second claim, I argue that by altering behaviour without altering
attitudes, the eﬀectiveness of second-category nudges is compromised as a means to
motivate eﬀective action to address global poverty.
Before doing so, it is necessary to answer two immediate objections that may occur to
the reader at this point. The ﬁrst objection is that this argument relies on the assumption
that a single source of motivation is typically responsible for a given act, which presents
an overly simplistic picture of human psychology and motivation. That this is overly
simplistic is correct. However, I am operating on the assumption that some degree of
altruistic motivation is present, but one that is insuﬃcient to motivate a donation without
the additional prudential motivation provided by the nudge. Charitable campaigns that
attempt to alter attitudes, by fostering sentimental or moral concern, can potentially
develop these more altruistic sources of motivation. However, in instances where second-
category nudges are employed, this function is absent.
The second objection is that by criticizing the use of second-category nudges that
aim to alter actions by securing donations without a corresponding change in attitudes,
I am letting the perfect be the enemy of the good, operating from an idealized baseline
where donations deriving from largely non-altruistic motives are wrongly criticized in
comparison to donations stemming from altruistic motives. Here, it may be objected
that I am failing to take into account that the donation in the former case would not
take place without the nudge.48
However, this objection implausibly assumes a baseline of inaction, which takes all
charitable giving as supererogatory. Even if we grant that a baseline of inaction is
appropriate in the moral assessment of individual donors, this does not apply when
assessing the use of second-category nudges by NGOs and governments as a means to
facilitate charitable donations. In these institutional cases, the adoption of nudge strate-
gies is a zero-sum issue, as NGOs and governments only have ﬁnite resources. Therefore,
employing second-category nudges will necessarily be at the expense of alternative
48Lichtenberg, Distant Strangers, 243.
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approaches. As such, the correct baseline for assessing second-category nudges in these
circumstances is in comparison to alternative methods of motivating donations.
Eﬀectiveness
Fundraising campaigns to reduce global poverty can be eﬀective in two diﬀerent ways.
In the more obvious sense, eﬀectiveness can be understood as a function of the amount
of money raised and the success of the scheme to which this is directed. However,
fundraising campaigns can also be eﬀective by motivating changes in attitudes:
encouraging normative reﬂection on global poverty or increasing levels of aﬀective
concern for the global poor. These changes in attitude may in turn motivate further
action to reduce global poverty, such as future donations, lifestyle changes or commit-
ments to political action. Second-category nudges that rely on prudential sources of
motivation, aiming to alter actions not attitudes, cannot contribute towards this second
type of eﬀectiveness.
In contrast, more traditional methods of motivating donations, which aim to provoke
moral or sentimental concern for the global poor, may lead to the development, or
strengthening, of broader motivating commitments to reducing global poverty. There is
signiﬁcant empirical support for the claim that the traditional fundraising strategies
employed by NGOs working to reduce global poverty are eﬀective in altering normative
attitudes towards global poverty49 and increasing levels of aﬀective concern for the global
poor.50 Social psychological studies also lend weight to the further claim that altering
normative attitudes51 and aﬀective responses52 towards instances of global injustice leads
individuals to engage in action to address these injustices. Broader research in the
psychological sub-ﬁeld of social inﬂuence further supports the general claim that altering
normative attitudes is necessary to achieve lasting behaviour change.53
It might be objected that second-category nudges are suﬃciently eﬀective at achiev-
ing the desired behavioural changes in the instances in which they are employed so as
to outweigh any advantages traditional interventions can oﬀer via this second type of
eﬀectiveness. The eﬀectiveness of second-category nudges in motivating donations in
the speciﬁc instances in which they are employed will depend on the speciﬁc nudge in
question, and likely diﬀer between agents. However, it is by no means clear that
prudential motives oﬀer a more eﬀective means of motivating charitable donations in
the short term than appeals to moral or sentimental concern. Studies by Heyman and
Ariely54 suggest that appealing to incentives undermines the eﬀectiveness of fundraising
campaigns, as this encourages individuals to perceive the transaction in market terms,
causing potential donors to focus on instrumental losses and gains and to ignore the
49Albertson and Lawrence, “After the Credits Roll.”
50Jeﬀery, Reason and Emotion in International Ethics.
51Fischer, “Feedback on Household Electricity Consumption”; and Bolderdijk et al., “Promoting Pro-Environmental
Behaviour.”
52Thomas et al., “The Role of Prosocial Emotions”; and Izard and Ackerman, “Motivational Organisational, and
Regulatory Functions.”
53Mols et al. “Why a Nudge is Not Enough”; Turner, Social Inﬂuence; and Sparks and Shepherd, “Theory of Planned
Behaviour.”
54Heyman and Ariely, “Eﬀort for Payment.”
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normative element. The same result is replicated in separate studies by Kamenica,
Kosters and van Heijden (2012).55
Although answering this empirical question deﬁnitively is beyond the scope of this
paper, the three following reasons suggest that the burden of proof is on the advocate
of second-category nudges. Firstly, in order for a second-category nudge to be prefer-
able to an alternative means of motivating a donation, its eﬀectiveness in motivating a
donation would need to be suﬃciently great so as to outweigh the combined beneﬁts of
the alternative approach, both as a means to secure donations and as a means to alter
attitudes. Absent strong empirical evidence in favour of the eﬀectiveness of second-
category nudges, this supports a presumption in favour of alternatives.
Secondly, the empirical literature on poverty reduction suggests that many charitable
schemes prove ineﬀective, or even counterproductive.56 Although this is not typical, the
outcome is by no means unusual. Determining the eﬀectiveness of a given charitable
scheme also faces epistemic limitations and is vulnerable to brute luck. Employing second-
category nudges limits possible positive consequences to this speciﬁc context. In contrast,
fundraising techniques that attempt to alter normative attitudes, or increase concern for the
global poor can potentially contribute towards reducing global poverty, even when the
speciﬁc campaign they are part of proves ineﬀective. Therefore, modesty over our ability to
determine the eﬀectiveness of a given charitable scheme in advance oﬀers a further reason
to place the burden of proof on the advocate of second-category nudges.
Thirdly, charitable contributions alone are unlikely to provide a comprehensive
solution to global poverty. Alongside ﬁnancial support for the work of NGOs, political
reform of global and national institutions is likely to be required. Recognition of this
need for a combined approach is commonplace in both international political theory
and international development.57 Comprehensive solutions are also likely to require
changes in lifestyle by individuals in developed countries. As second-category nudges
aim to alter behaviour in a given instance without provoking a corresponding change in
attitudes, they are unlikely to contribute towards motivating comprehensive solutions.
Second-category nudges and changes in attitude
I have argued that although second-category nudges may secure desired behavioural
changes in the short term, these are not supported by corresponding changes in
normative attitudes. However, Luc Bovens has suggested that by altering an individual’s
behaviour, second-category nudges may lead to changes in attitudes over time.58 I now
examine the plausibility of this claim. First, I assess the three mechanisms that Bovens
outlines through which nudges may prompt attitude changes in individuals who are
subject to nudges. I then consider a ﬁnal possibility: that second-category nudges may
alter attitudes indirectly through prompting reﬂection on the part of non-donors. I
argue that, on either method, the role of second-category nudges in altering attitudes by
altering behaviour is likely to be minimal.
55Kosters and van der Heijden, “From Mechanism to Virtue.”; Kamenica, “Behavioral Economics and Psychology of
Incentives.”
56Easterly, The White Man’s Burden; and Lichtenberg, Distant Strangers, 177–206.
57Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 36; Singer, The Life You Can Save, 20; and Oxfam, “What We Work On.”
58Bovens, “The Ethics of Nudge.”
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Direct mechanisms
Bovens oﬀers three mechanisms by which, through altering behaviour, nudges might
lead to corresponding changes in attitudes: (i) changes in behaviour may serve an
‘educative function’; (ii) by performing certain actions, ‘feelings may simply shift’; and
(iii) ‘one may come to self-identify as a person who acts [in a certain manner] on
grounds of cognitive dissonance.’59 I will address each in turn.
The educative function of actions. Unlike health nudges, which are the focus of
Bovens’ account, the experiential content of the action performed by donating to
charity is fairly minimal. Plausibly, an agent learns more about running by going
running than they learn about charity by setting up a direct debit or physically handing
over money. More signiﬁcantly, the act of donating has little educative function
concerning the charitable cause itself. However, in altering patterns of behaviour, the
nudge may inspire reﬂection on the issues the charity seeks to address, and in doing so
potentially inspire a genuine moral commitment. As John et al. put this, ‘a nudge may
lead to a demand to think.’60 For example, a second-category nudge leading an
individual to donate to charity may result in this individual reﬂecting on the value of
the work the charity does, leading to the development of a moral commitment.
However, in this instance, the educative function is primarily performed by the
attempt to solicit a donation in the form of media developed by the charity or an
encounter with a fundraiser. Accordingly, a nudged act of charitable giving does not
oﬀer a greater opportunity for reﬂection on the charitable cause than an attempt to
solicit a donation that fails. The prudential motivation provided by the second-category
nudge may help direct the attention of the nudged individual to this information, but
unlike nudges aimed at prompting changes in lifestyle, the action itself has little
educative function.
Shifts in feelings. The experience of donating to charity may have little educative value,
but it does have potential positive content. On the ‘warm glow theory of altruism’, the
positive feelings resulting from performing altruistic acts serve to make altruism
attractive.61 Therefore, a second-category nudge may have the potential to inspire
further commitments, as these ‘hedonistic’ beneﬁts might not be obvious prior to
giving.
However, the simplicity of the mechanism suggested by this argument does not oﬀer
a plausible basis for the development of the complex phenomenon of a normative
commitment to reducing global poverty. The hedonistic beneﬁts of giving provide a
reason to think that additional donations may follow when the nudge is no longer in
place, and potential support for the thought that the nudge may inspire further acts of
charity. But it presents an implausibly simplistic and deterministic picture of human
psychology in suggesting that the development of complex normative beliefs concern-
ing global poverty can be primarily attributed to this mechanism. This simplistic picture
relies on a very strong reading of the warm glow theory of altruism, rather than a more
59Ibid., 214.
60John et al., “Nudge Nudge, Think Think,” 369.
61Andreoni, “Altruism and Donations to Public Goods.”
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nuanced account. Experiments by Batson et al. that attempted to isolate the desire to
behave altruistically from causal responsibly for the altruistic act have cast serious doubt
on the plausibility of a strong reading of the warm glow theory. In these experiments,
altruistic choices did not decrease, despite the warm glow theory suggesting otherwise.62
This does not rule out the more sophisticated psychological egoism of the ‘empathic joy
hypothesis’, which suggests that altruism results from the hedonistic beneﬁt we derive
from the pleasure of others.63 However, the empathic joy hypothesis suggests that
hedonistic beneﬁts result regardless of an agent’s own causal responsibility for another’s
pleasure. Therefore, it is unclear that changes in attitudes can be directly attributed to
the experiential content of the donation itself, and that the nudge is primarily respon-
sible for altering attitudes.
Cognitive dissonance. Bovens’ most promising suggestion as to how second-category
nudges might lead to changes in attitudes is through the phenomenon of cognitive
dissonance. ‘Cognitive dissonance’ is used here to refer to the unpleasant feeling when
our beliefs and actions do not cohere. The signiﬁcance of this for second-category
nudges is that, in an attempt to achieve consistency, individuals often alter their beliefs
rather than their actions. As Stoker notes, ‘psychologists suggest that people seek
consistency between their beliefs and their behavior. However, when beliefs and
behavior clash, we frequently alter our beliefs instead of adjusting our behavior.’64
Therefore, where a second-category nudge leads an individual to donate towards
reducing global poverty, they may come to identify with this end in order to achieve
cognitive consistency. This suggests a potential mechanism by which nudged charitable
giving could lead to the development of a corresponding normative commitment.
However, instances where this mechanism results in a change in attitudes will be
limited for the following two reasons: ﬁrstly, some people can live with a high degree of
inconsistency between their attitudes and actions – political philosophers are likely
more troubled by dissonance than other people; and secondly, it is an assumption of
this argument that it oﬀers a fairly novel method of belief formation, and instead,
actions typically reﬂect attitudes. Despite these qualiﬁcations, this strikes me as a
plausible account of how a second-category nudge might play a limited role in altering
attitudes. However, this argument oﬀers no reason to think that any changes in attitude
that occur will be suﬃciently robust to motivate further actions. On this model, the
dissonance is solved by the thought that one cares enough about global poverty to make
the donation resulting from the nudge. This brings attitudes into line with actions
rather than motivating further action. Therefore, this mechanism oﬀers little reason to
think that any changes in belief that result will be signiﬁcant enough to motivate further
action towards reducing global poverty.
Indirect mechanisms
However, the role of second-category nudges in altering attitudes may be more indirect.
Rather than altering the attitudes of nudged individuals, second-category nudges may
62Stich et al., “Altruism,” 197.
63Batson, The Altruism Question.
64Stoker, “The Politics of Nudge,” 227.
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alter the attitudes of non-donors. Through increasing instances of charitable
giving, second-category nudges may lead to increased instances of non-donors reﬂect-
ing on global poverty, which may in turn lead to normative commitments to donate. In
the ﬁnal section of this paper, I suggest two tentative mechanisms through which this
process could occur, and oﬀer some reasons for thinking that their role will be limited.
Although neither mechanism accords second-category nudges a central role in attitude
change, they may suggest a modest role for second-category nudges in this process.
Valuing charity. Where second-category nudges operate by capitalizing on a desire for
esteem or social status, this relies on the existence of a culture in which making
charitable contributions is socially valued. Here, the use of second-category nudges
may cause non-donors to reﬂect on why charitable giving is socially valued, which may
in turn lead to a normative commitment to donate.65
The ﬁrst concern here is the highly abstract nature of the deliberation, which sits
uneasily with the assumption of bounded rationality underpinning the nudge approach.
This is less of a concern for deliberation prompted by traditional fundraising cam-
paigns, which operate at a more aﬀective level, employing emotive portrayals of distant
others to engage sentimental concern. Secondly, this mechanism relies on donating to
charity in general being socially valued, rather than the speciﬁc concern of addressing
global poverty.66 Charity being held in high regard may encourage reﬂective commit-
ments to donating, but this oﬀers no reason to motivate commitments to addressing
global poverty more broadly, such as through political action or lifestyle changes.
Finally, this mechanism operates on the basis that donating to charity is socially valued,
not the recognition of an obligation to donate. Where social norms reﬂect the belief that
donations towards global poverty are supererogatory, any moral commitments arising
as a result are likely to be relatively weak in nature.
Social pressure. Where second-category nudges lead to increased instances of charita-
ble giving, this behaviour may alter perceptions of the norms that are operative in
society, with nudged charitable giving being taken by non-donors to reﬂect a corre-
sponding normative belief on the part of donors. Here, social pressure may provide an
additional incentive for non-donors to reconsider their own views, potentially leading
to a change in normative attitudes. This is supported by recent work in moral psychol-
ogy on social norms suggesting ‘that injunctive norms – what people ought to do – …
can be overwhelmed by descriptive norms – what people are actually doing.’67
However, the role for second-category nudges in altering perceptions of social norms
is likely to be relatively modest for the following reasons. Firstly, many acts of charity
are not publically observable, or are minimally observable; therefore, it is hard to see
how they can play a signiﬁcant part in altering perceptions of social norms.68 Secondly,
this mechanism is too localized to play a substantial role in altering social norms.
65I thank an anonymous reviewer for this helpful suggestion.
66The global poor may be thought to feature in this deliberation in the wrong manner, where donating is valued, rather
than the global poor themselves.
67Campbell-Arvai et al., “Motivating Sustainable Food Choices,” 469.
68Admittedly, this is partially mitigated where second-category nudges operate by making acts of charity more
observable in order to increase social beneﬁts deriving from giving.
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Available information would diﬀer too substantially from person to person to plausibly
account for the development of norms that existed beyond the level of the individual.
Finally, according a primary causal role to deductive inferences from personally
observed behaviour oﬀers an implausibly atomistic account of social norms. This
ignores the social nature of these norms and fails to take into account the role of the
media, and communication more generally, in their development and propagation.
I have outlined two tentative mechanisms through which second-category nudges
might play a very limited role in attitude change in the long term. At present, I do not
think these mechanisms oﬀer a convincing rebuttal of the normative objections facing
the use of second-category nudges to motivate donations towards reducing global
poverty. However, in order to draw more deﬁnitive normative conclusions, further
empirical research on these mechanisms is needed. I hope that the arguments made
within this paper highlight the need for future collaborative research in this area
between political philosophers and social scientists, and can oﬀer a useful starting point.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the normative status of the use of nudges by NGOs and
governments to motivate charitable donations towards reducing global poverty. I began
by arguing that the deﬁnitions of nudges provided in the literature are unsuitable for
this context, failing to distinguish between very diﬀerent methods of behavioural
modiﬁcation. To address this, I oﬀered a three-part typology of nudges, based on
how a nudge interacts with an agent’s motivational structure. I then assessed the use
of nudges in each category as a means to motivate donations towards reducing global
poverty, drawing the following three conclusions: (i) the use of ﬁrst-category nudges
faces no signiﬁcant normative objections in this context; (ii) the use of third-category
nudges in the context of charitable giving faces distinct normative concerns, as they
circumvent reﬂection on the poverty they seek to address – however, scope for their
employment in this context is limited, as they face both legal and practical obstacles;
and (iii) second-category nudges, which aim to secure charitable donations by capita-
lizing on prudential sources of motivation, present a complex case, but where possible,
NGOs and governments ought to favour alternative methods of encouraging donations.
To support this conclusion, I advanced the following two claims: ﬁrstly, that it over-
simpliﬁes the complexity of using second-category nudges to motivate charitable giving
to portray this as a case of choosing good outcomes over good motives – instead,
as second-category nudges aim to achieve changes in behaviour without altering
attitudes, the positive consequences of their employment in charitable campaigns are
limited; and secondly, although it has been suggested that, by altering behaviour-
, second-category nudges might themselves engender a change in normative attitudes
over time, their causal role in this process appears to be limited. However, there is a
need for further collaborative research in this area between political philosophers and
social scientists. In sum, nudges provide no easy substitute for the complex and vital
task of altering attitudes towards global poverty.
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